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‘‘On n’arrête pas un incendie avec un
compte-gouttes.’’ (‘‘You can’t extinguish a
fire with a dropper.’’) —E. Jamot
(attributed) [1]
Who remembers ‘‘l’éveilleur’’ (‘‘the awak-
ener’’), Colonel Eugène Jamot (1879–
1937) [2]? Many still, it would seem,
judging from the constant stream of
biographies and articles that have ap-
peared over the century, commemorating
his contributions to the control of sleeping
sickness, otherwise known as human
African trypanosomiasis (HAT) [1,3].
There is even an association that has been
established and dedicated to his life and
achievements [4].
Jamot and La Jamotique
The young Jamot, who had earlier been
stationed as a military physician in Algeria
and Chad and undergone a stint in HAT
research at the Pasteur Institute in Paris,
had just been posted to the Institute at
Brazzaville in French Congo (now Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo) when he
received mobilization orders to support
action against the Germans in Cameroon.
At the campaign’s end and by the time of
his return to Brazzaville, he had travelled
across sufficiently vast stretches of French
Equatorial Africa to have witnessed first-
hand the devastation wrought by HAT.
The Gambian form of this disease—
caused by Trypanosoma brucei gambiense,
transmitted by the tsetse fly, and increas-
ingly rampant in the decades before the
20th century began—was rendering vil-
lages extinct [5].
Charged by the Governor General to
lead a campaign against HAT, Jamot
launched in 1916 a systematic and sus-
tained offensive in Oubangui-Chari (now
Central African Republic [CAR]). His
approach to ‘‘medical prophylaxis’’ in-
volved the dispatch on foot of survey
teams, comprising medical auxiliaries and
microscopists headed by a few physicians
and nurses, followed up by independent
treatment teams moving in to administer
atoxyl to the HAT cases (Figure 1A–C).
Within defined sectors, each village was
visited and then revisited repeatedly to
complete the course of trypanocidal injec-
tions. Jamot sought to eradicate HAT by
extinguishing the trypanosomal reservoir
rather than merely to impair the efficiency
of vector transmission by suppressing the
collective parasitemic load of the popula-
tion. Within 18 months, nearly 90,000
people were examined, which led to .
5,000 HAT cases being identified and
receiving treatment [6].
In 1922, Jamot was assigned to Camer-
oon to set up an autonomous special
service against HAT and was provided
substantial resources from the Ministry of
Colonies to prosecute the task. Having
established headquarters and a training
center in Ayos, he coordinated from there
28 mobile teams that included 17 physi-
cians and 400 auxiliaries. Therapy now
included use of tryparsarmide to improve
the cure rate for the second (neuropsychi-
atric) stage of HAT. By 1930, up to
150,000 cases had been diagnosed and
treated. HAT prevalence rates in the
hyperendemic sectors dropped precipi-
tously, e.g., from 60% to 4.1% in the
Lomie subdivision and from 17.8% to ,
0.1% in the Yaoundé subdivision [7].
Jamot won wide acclaim for these accom-
plishments. His rapid-deployment, survey-
and-treat approach to HAT eradication
acquired the sobriquet La Jamotique [4].
L’affaire de Bafia
The therapeutic ranges of atoxyl and
tryparsamide (both arsenicals) were nar-
row because of toxicity targeted particu-
larly at the optic nerve. When Jamot was
on home leave in 1931, a junior colleague
supervising the team then covering the
region of Bafia increased the dosage of
tryparsamide for treating advanced HAT.
Some 700 cases allegedly became blind.
Held responsible for this ‘‘therapeutic
crime’’ [8], Jamot was dismissed from his
post and assigned to Dakar, Senegal, and
then to Ouagadougou in Upper Volta
(now Burkina Faso). With a much smaller
workforce, he still managed to treat 68,000
HAT cases in French West Africa. Con-
tinued opposition from detractors who
criticized his achievements and the doc-
trine underlying them disheartened him.
In failing health, Jamot retired in 1936,
spending his last months working as a
village doctor in Sardent, Creuse [1,4].
The Bafia incident revived criticisms of
Jamot’s efforts to eliminate HAT. In
French West Africa, La Jamotique was
revoked in 1935, only to be restarted 4
years later. It was later replaced, in fits and
starts, by organizational structures and
systems directed at HAT (with vector
control added), but over the decades these
became polyvalent, orientated to tackle
other major infectious diseases like yaws,




Infections with hepatitis C virus (HCV),
hepatitis B virus (HBV), human T cell
lymphotropic virus, and HIV-2, unlike
HIV-1 infection, do not invariably or
quickly kill human hosts. HCV infection
is an especially good indicator of iatrogen-
ic blood-borne infection because it is
relatively widespread and transmits prin-
cipally along parenteral and percutaneous
routes. The extent to which iatrogenic
transmissions contributed to HCV infec-
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tion and by corollary to other blood-borne
pathogens has been tracked using sero-
prevalence studies of antiHCV IgG and
HCV viremia and molecular clock studies
of HCV genetic sequences. In Cameroon,
seroprevalence studies show up to 50%
prevalence in people born before 1945,
and molecular clock analyses of HCV
reveal population expansions of genotypes
1 and 2 between 1920 and the 1940s
and genotype 4 between 1910 and
the 1940s. In the CAR, people who
received trypanocidal treatment before
1951 have .3 times the risk of HCV
infection compared to those who never
received treatment. These various findings
point to large-scale medical interventions
conducted early in the 20th century
in certain African territories as contri-
buting to the endemicity of HCV and
perhaps other blood-borne pathogens
[9,10].
To what extent might Jamot’s mass
survey-and-treat operations (Figure 1A–C)
have led to the spread of blood-borne
pathogens in sub-Saharan Africa? When
he was implementing medical prophylaxis
in Oubangui-Chari, atoxyl was adminis-
tered by subcutaneous injection for HAT
cases in the first (hemolymphatic) stage
and injection into the spinal canal or
intramuscularly for second-stage cases.
That campaign used only six syringes
[6]. Up until the end of January 1929,
135,185 atoxyl injections were adminis-
tered in the Cameroon campaign [11].
Trypasarmide, when introduced, was also
a parenteral drug, primarily for intrave-
nous use.
Jamot was not unaware of safety
concerns associated with injection of these
trypanocidals. He applied stringent rules
for disinfecting injecting equipment; e.g.,
both syringes and needles were to be
boiled in water, and needles changed for
each patient [11]. These rules, when
followed, would have ensured disinfection
but not sterilization. Given that La Jamo-
tique was massive in scale and production
line in nature, breakdowns and exigencies
in the disinfection process were possible.
Nonetheless, the frequency of such inad-
vertences and the extent to which they
contributed to the endemicity of blood-
borne infectious agents remain unknown,
as many other mass interventions were
being conducted during that period in
history [9,10].
The Mobile Health Concept
American, Belgian, British, and French
practitioners of mobile health credit Jamot
as the founder of the concept [12], with
one British veteran referring to it as ‘‘the
characteristic French itinerant system’’
Figure 1. (A) Medical team with entire village, (B) open-air clinical examination (note Jamot in middle looking on and lone
microscope on table in front), and (C) lumbar puncture conducted by medical auxiliaries; rural Cameroon. (D) Colonel Jamot’s statue in
front of the Department of Disease Control, Cameroon Ministry of Public Health, Yaounde, Cameroon.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0002635.g001
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[13]. In modern-day Cameroon, the
Ministry of Health has put concept to
practice, having established the Laboratoire
National de Santé Hygiene Mobile to diagnose
HIV infection. Medical teams travel in
customized vans to isolated villages, where
rapid testing for HIV is conducted [14].
Testing will soon include HBV and HCV.
Since its implementation in 2005, 186
villages have been reached (with 62
villages covered more than once), and 12
vans are now operational. By the end of
2012, 157,560 people were tested for HIV,
and of these, 9,555 (6.1%) were found to
be infected and referred to district medical
centers for treatment. In rural Uganda, a
variation of the mobile health concept
involves community health workers who
travel by motorcycle dispensing weekly
antiretrovirals to HIV-infected patients in
their homes [15].
Conclusion
The name of Jamot continues to be
revered, his achievements in controlling
HAT epidemics not forgotten (Figure 1D).
Jamot averred that for successful control of
HAT it is necessary ‘‘to seek, to treat, and,
if possible, to cure the sick’’ (‘‘doit rechercher
les malades, les soigner et si possible les guérir’’)
[8]. Setting up a healthcare facility (dis-
pensary, clinic, or hospital) is inadequate
to control, let alone eliminate, disease
since, dependent as this approach is on
people having the means to travel or to be
brought to the facility, only passive
detection of disease is enabled. Using
specialized mobile teams for active case
finding improves health care by allowing
disease to be detected and then treated,
and, if the disease is infectious, by blocking
further transmission through removal or
shrinkage of the pathogen reservoir. Sys-
tematic, active case detection of a disease
or a group of diseases that may well be
coexisting syndemically is the one lasting
beneficent legacy of La Jamotique.
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